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AN IRRATIONAL OVERSIGHT: APPLYING THE
PLRA’S FEE RESTRICTIONS TO COLLATERAL
PRISONER LITIGATION1
Walker Newell†
The Federal Prison Litigation Reform Act precludes prisoners from
filing lawsuits in forma pauperis and imposes significant limitations on
the recovery of attorney’s fees. Many states have followed the lead of Congress by prohibiting their courts from waiving filing fees in prisoner
cases. The federal fee provisions have withstood a barrage of constitutional challenges, with courts uniformly holding that the provisions are
rationally related to a legitimate government interest in deterring frivolous inmate litigation. Many courts, however, apply these fee restrictions
in a manner that cannot be justified by the analysis generally supporting
the constitutionality of the provisions. In both state and federal courts,
fee restrictions are applied to litigation collateral to prisoners’ incarceration, such as appeals of bankruptcy and divorce court rulings. The denial of in forma pauperis status to prisoners in these proceedings bears
no relationship to the government interest in deterring frivolous inmate
litigation, instead imposing a substantial burden on the ability of prisoners to pursue important matters that is not felt by other indigent litigants. To the extent that state and federal fee restrictions continue to be
applied to certain collateral prisoner litigation, they are
unconstitutional.

I.

INTRODUCTION

As the United States prison system has grown astronomically
over the past 30 years, there has been correspondingly robust
growth in the amount of federal litigation brought by prisoners.2
By the early 1990s, the per capita rate of prisoner filings and the
absolute number of prisoner suits had reached levels that imposed
1 The term “collateral inmate litigation” is used throughout the article to refer to
litigation that is unrelated to a prisoner’s status as a prisoner. It encompasses all forms
of civil litigation unrelated to incarceration, such as appeals of adverse rulings in
divorce and bankruptcy courts and § 1983 police brutality suits. Later in the article, a
distinction will be drawn between the constitutionality of collateral civil rights suits
and other collateral civil litigation, but for the most part, all prisoner litigation
unrelated to incarceration will be termed “collateral.”
† J.D., 2011, Columbia Law School.
2 See, e.g., Margot Schlanger, Inmate Litigation, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1555, 1578–87
(2003) (detailing the “deluge” of inmate litigation that occurred from 1970s to early
1990s).
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a significant burden on the efficiency of federal courts.3 Concern
with these developments, possibly bolstered by a desire to appear
tough on crime in an election year,4 spurred legislative action. In
1996, Congress passed a new law that would effectively and severely
curtail the ability of prisoners to vindicate their rights in federal
court. With the enactment of the Prison Litigation Reform Act
(PLRA), the United States became perhaps the only country “in
which national legislation singles out prisoners for a unique set of
barriers to vindicating their legal rights in court.”5
The drafters of the PLRA took a variety of approaches to restrain prison litigation, including rigid exhaustion provisions,6 a
“physical injury” requirement,7 a ceiling on attorney’s fees,8 and a
prohibition on in forma pauperis (IFP) lawsuits.9 These measures
were specifically designed and intended to prevent prisoners from
rabidly litigating over grievances arising during their imprisonment: mistreatment by correctional staff; inadequate medical care;
and related issues. The first section of the Act, which addresses exhaustion, only applies to suits regarding “prison conditions.”10
However, the attorney’s and filing fees sections apply, respectively,
to “any action brought by a prisoner”11 and to “civil actions or appeals” brought by prisoners.12
It is clear that most prisoner litigation is covered by the
PLRA’s restrictions on IFP filings and the recovery of attorney’s
fees. But when confronted with certain types of litigation, the
courts have had difficulty agreeing on whether the PLRA applies.
There is a general consensus that habeas and mandamus actions
are not covered by the IFP provision’s “civil action” language,13 but
the applicability of the PLRA’s fee restrictions to other litigation is
3 Id. at 1584–87 (discussing a rise in both filing rates and the overall numbers of
filings in the early 1990s).
4 See Julie M. Riewe, The Least Among Us: Unconstitutional Changes in Prisoner Litigation Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 47 DUKE L.J. 117, 142 (1998) (making the
argument that the PLRA was motivated, at least in part, by such considerations).
5 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, NO EQUAL JUSTICE 2 (2009), available at http://www.
hrw.org/en/node/83713/section/2.
6 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (2006).
7 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e) (2006).
8 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(d) (2006).
9 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1) (2006).
10 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (2006).
11 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(d) (2006).
12 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1) (2006).
13 See, e.g., Reyes v. Keane, 90 F.3d 676 (2d Cir. 1996) (holding that the PLRA does
not apply to habeas corpus petitions), overruled on other grounds by Nelson v. Walker,
121 F.3d 828, 832–33 (2d Cir. 1997).
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uncertain. In particular, litigation involving matters that arose
before a prisoner’s incarceration does not fit comfortably with the
statute’s purposes. Recognizing this incompatibility, a small minority of courts, relying on legislative intent or canons of statutory interpretation, has ruled that the PLRA’s fee provisions do not apply
to claims that arose prior to a litigant’s period of incarceration.14
In contrast, the majority of courts implicitly consider all provisions
of the PLRA to apply to all litigation brought by prisoners, while a
few courts have explicitly held that the fee provisions are constitutional and applicable to all prisoner litigation.15 The Federal Bankruptcy Code adds additional texture to the discussion by singling
out prisoners as ineligible for fee waivers when filing for bankruptcy or appealing a bankruptcy court ruling.16
IFP limitations have also been extended to collateral prisoner
litigation through state law. By enacting laws modeled after the
PLRA, several states have prevented prisoners from proceeding IFP
in general matters such as appeals of divorce proceedings.17 A Wisconsin law modeled after the PLRA, for example, was enacted not
only to target conditions of confinement litigation but also to
“limit broadly prisoner litigation at taxpayers’ expense.”18 Similarly,
Michigan’s ban on prisoner IFP filings has been applied to inmate
appeals of divorce court rulings.19 In Colorado, a statute mirroring
the PLRA requires that all indigent prisoners bringing “civil actions” gradually pay full filing fees.20 Prisoners in these states are
faced with significant restrictions on their ability to file or appeal
both state and federal litigation.
These developments represent a distortion of the central pur14 See Robbins v. Chronister (Robbins I), 402 F.3d 1047, 1051–55 (10th Cir. 2005),
rev’d en banc, Robbins v. Chronister (Robbins II), 435 F.3d 1238 (10th Cir. 2006);
Hatchet v. Cnty. of Phila., No. 09-1708, 2010 WL 4054285, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 15,
2010); Hall v. Gallie, No. 05-975, 2009 WL 722278, at *7 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 17, 2009)
(attorney’s fees provisions of PLRA inapplicable to pre-conviction police brutality
claim).
15 See, e.g., Robbins II, 435 F.3d at 1244 (PLRA’s attorney’s fees provision applies to
all actions brought by prisoners); United States v. Jones, 215 F.3d 467 (4th Cir. 2000)
(motion to have property seized at arrest returned is civil action for purposes of IFP
provision of PLRA).
16 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(17) (2006).
17 See, e.g., Sirbaugh v. Young, 25 F. App’x 266 (6th Cir. 2001) (denying inmate
challenge of state IFP provisions modeled after PLRA); N.Y. C.P.L.R. 1101(a), (f)
(McKinney 2011) (New York statute mirroring PLRA’s IFP provisions).
18 State ex rel. Cramer v. Schwarz, 613 N.W.2d 591, 601 (Wis. 2000); see also State ex
rel. Henderson v. Raemisch, 790 N.W.2d 242 (Wis. Ct. App. 2010).
19 Sirbaugh, 25 F. App’x at 266.
20 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-17.5-103(2) (West, Westlaw through 2011 1st Reg.
Sess.).
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poses of the original PLRA, which was enacted to curtail frivolous
prisoner litigation. As the Second Circuit held in denying an early
challenge to the new IFP provisions, “the Act’s goal of relieving the
pressure of excessive prisoner filings on our overburdened federal
courts is a constitutionally legitimate one.”21 Although a legitimate
government interest in preventing excessive and frivolous prisoner
litigation has been comprehensively recognized by the courts, such
an interest does not justify some of the litigation discussed in the
preceding paragraphs. An appeal of a divorce court ruling cannot
be easily categorized as the frivolous prisoner litigation that the
PLRA was enacted to address. On the other hand, the plain language of the fee restrictions suggests that Congress intended the
Act to have an extensive reach.
The remainder of this article will interrogate the jurisprudential trend of imposing fee restrictions on all inmate litigants, not
merely those challenging their conditions of confinement. The
first section will briefly outline the structure of the Federal PLRA’s
fee restrictions, identify state laws imposing similar restrictions, and
investigate the practical significance of these restrictions. Next, the
article will discuss the few decisions to directly address the issue of
fee restrictions in the context of litigation unrelated to conditions
of confinement, ultimately finding that Congress intended the
PLRA’s fee restrictions to be applicable to all collateral prisoner
litigation. The final section will explore the possibility that the imposition of fee limitations on collateral prisoner litigation is prohibited by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. It will conclude
that the courts have a constitutional duty to refrain from imposing
fee restrictions on certain categories of collateral inmate litigation.
Independent of the constitutionality or interpretive validity of the
practice, the extension of the PLRA’s fee restrictions to all inmate
litigation is a sad and unnecessary coda to the statute’s symphony
of discordant treatment of hundreds of thousands of Americans.
II.

FEDERAL

AND

STATE FEE RESTRICTIONS
PRISONER LITIGATION

ON

COLLATERAL

[P]risoners are now faced with impossible choices: choosing,
for example, between spending money to bring a lawsuit after
being brutalized or sending money home to a child; making copayments for needed medical care or suing to protect one’s
rights . . . non-prisoners do not have to make such stark
21

Nicholas v. Tucker, 114 F.3d 17, 20 (2d Cir. 1997).
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choices.22

By restricting the ability of prisoners to litigate as poor persons
or recover full attorney’s fees, federal and state governments have
created an effective barrier to accessing the legal system. Although
these fee restrictions are not as burdensome as the strict exhaustion requirements embodied in the PLRA,23 they significantly limit
the incentives of inmates and attorneys to litigate. The PLRA contains several fee restrictions, including a prohibition on filing fee
waivers, a filing fee prepayment requirement for inmates who have
had three previous suits dismissed, and a cap on attorney’s fees.
Several state statutes have followed all or part of this scheme, so
that prisoners in those states are irrationally prevented from proceeding IFP in matters such as appeals of divorce court rulings.
These laws combine to frustrate legitimate inmate litigation and
impede prisoners from litigating important matters unrelated to
their incarceration.
A.

Filing Fees

When the PLRA was enacted, it included an amendment to
the general federal IFP statute, which imposes unique burdens on
prisoners not felt by other indigent persons. Title 28, § 1915(a) of
the U.S. Code provides that federal courts may waive filing fees for
litigants who cannot afford them. Prisoner litigants are the only
group ineligible for this exercise of judicial discretion. Unlike all
other indigent litigants, prisoners are “required to pay the full
amount of a filing fee” and directed to make a 20% prepayment
toward that obligation.24 To ease the burden on prisoners who cannot afford filing fees at the outset of litigation, the statute allows for
installment payments.25 Prisoners who cannot pay up front have a
lien placed on their prison account, with automatic deductions
made until filing fees are repaid.26 The statute also contains a savings clause which provides that no litigant shall be denied access to
the courts because of his or her inability to prepay a portion of
filing fees.27 Finally, prisoner litigants who have had three or more
lawsuits dismissed must pay full filing fees at the outset of subsequent litigation.28
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

Murray v.
42 U.S.C.
28 U.S.C.
28 U.S.C.
Id.
28 U.S.C.
28 U.S.C.

Dosal, 150 F.3d 814, 820 (8th Cir. 1998) (Heaney, J., dissenting).
§ 1997e(a) (2006).
§ 1915(b)(1) (2006).
§ 1915(b)(2) (2006).
§ 1915(b)(4) (2006).
§ 1915(g) (2006).
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Many states have followed the letter or spirit of the PLRA, imposing restrictions on the ability of prisoners to litigate IFP in state
court. New York’s statute, for example, is almost an exact replica of
the PLRA, directing courts to seek partial payment at the outset of
litigation, mandating the gradual repayment of all filing fees, and
containing a savings clause preserving completely indigent inmates’ access to the courts.29 Statutes in Wisconsin,30 Delaware,31
Virginia,32 Massachusetts,33 Georgia,34 and Missouri,35 among
others,36 follow a similar formula, providing for some form of prepayment or subsequent installment plan payments for indigent
inmates.
In each state, prisoners are denied IFP status without regard to
whether or not they are challenging their conditions of confinement, creating disincentives for them to participate in litigation of
any kind. The application of IFP prohibitions to all state prisoner
litigation is puzzling. While federal prisoner litigation is largely
made up of civil rights claims,37 prisoners may find themselves in
state court for a variety of reasons unrelated to alleged civil rights
violations. By placing fee restrictions on this type of litigation,
which has no relationship to the type of frivolous prisoner litigation targeted by the Federal PLRA,38 state legislatures have exacted
additional, unseen revenge on those convicted of crimes.
29

N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 1101(f) (McKinney 2011).
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 814.29 (West, Westlaw through 2011 Act 31, Acts 33 to 36, and
Acts 38 to 44).
31 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10 § 8804(b) (West, Westlaw through 78 Laws 2011, chs.
1–203).
32 VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-691 (LEXIS 2011).
33 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 261, § 29(d)(1) (West, Westlaw through ch. 175 of
2011 1st Ann. Sess.).
34 GA. CODE ANN. § 42-12-4 (LEXIS 2011).
35 MO. ANN. STAT. § 514.040(2) (West, Westlaw through 2011 1st Extraordinary
Sess.).
36 See, e.g., Texas (TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 14.006 (West, Westlaw
through 2011 Reg. Sess.)); Minnesota (MINN. STAT. ANN. § 563.02 (West, Westlaw
through 2011 1st Spec. Sess.)); and Louisiana (LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §15:1186 (West,
Westlaw through 2011 1st Extraordinary and Reg. Sess.)).
37 Schlanger, supra note 2, at 1558.
38 See 141 Cong. Rec. S14, 629 (daily ed. Sept. 29, 1995) (statement of Sen. Jon Kyl
describing the “frivolous” types of prison litigation the act’s sponsors intended to target, such as a lawsuit brought by a plaintiff who was served a “hacked up” piece of
cake, a suit based on allegations that medical staff had implanted a mind control
device in the plaintiff’s head, and a suit brought by a death row inmate against correctional staff for taking away his Gameboy). It is notable that there is no mention in this
record of collateral prisoner litigation on the dockets of federal courts, suggesting the
PLRA’s framers were unaware of this potential application of the act. Cf. Schlanger,
supra note 2, at 1571–73.
30
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Despite the allowance of gradual payment and the existence of
savings clauses, the laws preventing inmates from proceeding IFP
are extremely burdensome. IFP statutes exist because court costs,
while manageable for most litigants, can be impossible for low-income plaintiffs to afford. The cost of filing a civil suit in United
States District Court is $350,39 while the initial filing fee in New
York County is $210.40 On top of filing fees, prisoners may be responsible for significant expenses that accrue during litigation,
such as the costs of taking depositions and printing copies of the
record.41 Since prisoners in federal and state prisons typically make
less than a dollar per hour (while in some states, prisoners engage
in unpaid labor) these costs may present an insurmountable obstacle.42 One prisoner who litigated pro se through trial and appellate
proceedings racked up over $1,300 in fees, an amount that, according to the Second Circuit, would have taken him nine years to repay at his weekly salary of around seven dollars.43 The prospect of
automatic monthly deductions from prison accounts (used to pay
for essential goods, such as certain mailing and hygienic materials
not provided by the prison)44 lasting for years may operate as a
substantial disincentive to even the most aggrieved prisoner
litigants.
In addition to creating financial barriers to prisoner litigation,
the prohibition on IFP filings in cases unrelated to conditions of
confinement embodies a troubling culture within the legal system.
The costs of incarcerating a greater percentage of the population
than any other nation in the world have become increasingly clear:
prisons have long been overflowing; spending on prisons has
39 Frequently Asked Questions, U.S. COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/Common/
FAQS.aspx#filing (last visited Oct. 4, 2011).
40 Court Fees, NEW YORK SUPREME COURT, http://www.nycourts.gov/supctmanh/
court_fees.htm (last visited Oct. 4, 2011).
41 See, e.g., Whitfield v. Scully, 241 F.3d 264, 268–69 (2d Cir. 2001) (tallying IFP
inmate litigant’s deposition and printing costs).
42 PETER WAGNER, THE PRISON POLICY INITIATIVE, THE PRISON INDEX: TAKING THE
PULSE OF THE CRIME CONTROL INDUSTRY § III (2003), available at http://www.
prisonpolicy.org/prisonindex/prisonlabor.html.
43 Whitfield, 241 F.3d at 268–69. The Second Circuit eventually held that the
PLRA’s cap on filing fee deductions from inmate accounts did not apply to deductions for costs owed for other court costs. Id. at 278. Accordingly, the court allowed
40% of the plaintiff’s income to be deducted toward his court costs. Id.
44 See, e.g., Matt Stiles, Texas Prisoners Spent $95 Million at Commissaries, TEX.
TRIBUNE, Apr. 8, 2010, http://www.texastribune.org/texas-dept-criminal-justice/
texas-department-of-criminal-justice/texas-prisoners-spent-95-million-at-commissaries
(detailing prisoner commissary expenditures on hygiene, mailing, and supplemental
food).
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grown astronomically at the expense of education;45 and prisoner
litigation has burdened the courts for years. The PLRA’s filing fee
limitations could have been a reasonable response to the last problem if they had been narrowly tailored to prevent truly frivolous
litigation. Instead, the application of these provisions to all prisoner litigation is a reflection of government’s unwillingness to admit to the devastating consequences of mass incarceration.
B.

Attorney’s Fees

Another provision of the PLRA that has had a significant impact on the practicability of prisoner litigation is the statute’s restrictions on attorney’s fees. Under 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(d), a
prevailing plaintiff’s recovery of attorney’s fees from a defendant is
limited to 150% of the money damages awarded. The statute also
requires that up to 25% of the plaintiff’s total money damages be
put toward those fees.46 Finally, the Act caps the effective hourly
wage that lawyers representing prisoners can receive at rates comparable to the amount paid to lawyers working in indigent defense.47 These provisions are extremely significant in cases where a
plaintiff is victorious but only awarded nominal damages. When a
prisoner is awarded one dollar in damages as symbolic vindication
of his constitutional rights, his attorney is not compensated.
As a result of these provisions, it is difficult for attorneys to
litigate on behalf of prisoners. The PLRA’s fee limitations have
“fundamentally altered an attorney’s decision to represent prisoners by adding a heavy financial burden that impacts public and private attorneys alike.”48 Public interest organizations, which play a
vital role in litigating civil rights cases, are always in need of funding, and restrictions on attorney’s fees limit the number of cases
they are able to accept.49 Private attorneys seeking to litigate prisoners’ rights cases are deterred to an even greater extent. The
PLRA’s limitations make representing prisoners almost a financial
impossibility for lawyers seeking to make a profit.50
45 See, e.g., NAACP, MISPLACED PRIORITIES: OVER INCARCERATE, UNDER EDUCATE 7,
14 (2011), available at http://naacp.3cdn.net/01d6f368edbe135234_bq0m68x5h.pdf
(finding that between 1987 and 2007 funding for corrections increased by 127%,
while funding for education increased by only 21%).
46 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(d)(2) (2006).
47 See Lynn S. Branham, Toothless in Truth? The Ethereal Rational Basis Test and the
Prison Litigation Act’s Disparate Restrictions on Attorney’s Fees, 89 CAL. L. REV. 999, 1007
(2001).
48 Karen M. Klotz, The Price of Civil Rights, 73 TEMP. L. REV. 759, 790 (2000).
49 Id. at 790–91.
50 Id.
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In Walker v. Bain, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, while
affirming the facial constitutionality of the PLRA’s attorney’s fees
provisions, noted the deterrent effect that the law would have on
viable civil rights claims.
[Section]1997e(d)(2) will have a strong chilling effect upon
counsel’s willingness to represent prisoners who have meritorious claims . . . We admit to being troubled by a federal statute
that seeks to reduce the number of meritorious civil rights
claims and protect the public fisc at the expense of denying a
politically unpopular group their ability to vindicate actual, albeit “technical,” civil rights violations.51

Although the plaintiff in Walker brought a successful retaliation
claim against corrections officers, during which his attorneys
amassed expenses and wages totaling roughly $36,000, the total
award of attorney’s fees was limited to $629.52 With these numbers
in mind, private attorneys are likely to only accept prisoner cases
with the potential for significant damages.53
While attorney’s fees are not typically part of remedies in the
United States, they have long been awarded to indigent plaintiffs
who succeed in causes of action under civil rights statutes. In the
watershed Civil Rights Act of 1964, Congress authorized the recovery of reasonable attorney’s fees, enabling a generation of civil
rights litigants to enter the courts.54 In Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, the Supreme Court recognized the systematic importance of
allowing for attorney’s fees in civil rights litigation, noting that “[i]f
successful plaintiffs were routinely forced to bear their own attorney’s fees, few aggrieved parties would be in a position to advance
the public interest by invoking the injunctive powers of the federal
courts.”55 The PLRA’s attorney’s fees provisions have frustrated this
objective, preventing potential landmark cases from being litigated
and won in the prison context. Even more significantly, the provisions prevent prisoners from litigating civil rights claims deriving
from events that occurred before they were incarcerated.56 Because
of these limitations and the aforementioned prohibition on IFP fil51

Walker v. Bain, 257 F.3d 660, 670 (6th Cir. 2001).
See id. at 674 (remanding to trial court for reassessment of attorney’s fees under
the PLRA).
53 See, e.g., Fred Cohen, The Limits of Judicial Reform of Prisons: What Works; What Does
Not, 40 CRIM. L. BULL. 1, 1 n.1 (2004).
54 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-3 (2006).
55 See Klotz, supra note 48, at 764 (quoting Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, 390
U.S. 400, 401 (1968)).
56 See, e.g., Robbins II, 435 F.3d 1238 (10th Cir. 2006) (limiting attorney’s fees for
successful § 1983 claim that arose prior to incarceration).
52
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ing, prisoners are not only deterred from bringing legitimate
claims arising out of their incarceration; they are prevented from
bringing important claims that are not prison litigation at all.
III.

APPLYING

THE

PLRA TO COLLATERAL PRISONER LITIGATION:
RATIONAL OR ABSURD?

On scattered occasions, pro se litigants57 and attorneys have
forced the courts to consider whether the PLRA’s fee restrictions
should apply to litigation unrelated to a plaintiff’s incarceration.
Most courts to consider the question, including three courts of appeals, have determined that the fee restrictions are constitutional
as applied to all civil litigation brought by prisoners, including
bankruptcy appeals,58 divorce appeals,59 motions to return property seized by the state,60 and civil rights claims that arose before
the plaintiff was incarcerated.61 In contrast, a minority of courts to
address the issue head-on has ruled that the PLRA’s fee provisions
do not apply to pre-incarceration claims. Finally, many courts apply
the PLRA’s fee provisions to collateral prisoner litigation without
considering whether the application is warranted. The following
section will consider each jurisprudential trend, highlighting the
inadequate constitutional reasoning of the first group of cases, the
failed analysis found in the second group of cases, and the willful
blindness of the third group of cases.
A.

Unsubstantiated Findings of Rationality

The interest most commonly asserted by the federal government in support of the PLRA is the prevention of frivolous and
burdensome prisoner litigation.62 When considering constitutional
challenges to the application of the PLRA’s fee restrictions to conditions of confinement suits, the courts have uniformly found that
the government interest in curbing excessive litigation satisfies the
57

See, e.g., Sirbaugh v. Young, 25 F. App’x 266 (6th Cir. 2001).
See Lefkowitz v. Citi-Equity Group, 146 F.3d 609 (8th Cir. 1998).
59 See Sirbaugh, 25 F. App’x 266.
60 See U.S. v. Jones, 215 F.3d 467 (4th Cir. 2000).
61 See Robbins II, 435 F.3d at 1238.
62 See, e.g., Hampton v. Hobbs, 106 F.3d 1281, 1286 (6th Cir. 1997) (“The legislation was aimed at the skyrocketing numbers of claims filed by prisoners—many of
which are meritless—and the corresponding burden those filings have placed on the
federal courts.”); Santana v. United States, 98 F.3d 752, 755 (3d Cir. 1996) (“Congress
enacted the PLRA primarily to curtail claims brought by prisoners under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 and the Federal Tort Claims Act, most of which concern prison conditions and
many of which are routinely dismissed as legally frivolous.”).
58
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rational basis test.63 Some courts have taken this argument beyond
the boundaries of its logic, however, by assuming that the legitimate government interest in deterring frivolous prisoner litigation
can be used to justify the imposition of fee restrictions on, for example, an inmate challenging the ruling of a divorce court.64
These courts have employed shallow reasoning in rejecting as-applied constitutional challenges to the PLRA and state laws. In response to challenges not derived from the constitution, other
courts have achieved a more thorough justification of the application of the PLRA’s fee restrictions to collateral prison litigation as a
correct exercise of statutory interpretation.65 Thus, while the argument that Congress intended the PLRA to apply to collateral
prison litigation is persuasive, this application’s constitutionality is
suspect.
i.

Rejections of As-Applied Constitutional Challenges

Lefkowitz v. Citi-Equity Group was the first case to rule on a constitutional challenge to the PLRA’s filing fee restrictions as applied
to collateral prisoner litigation.66 In Lefkowitz, the plaintiff was a
prisoner appealing an adverse ruling by a bankruptcy court.67 After
the Eighth Circuit denied his petition to proceed IFP on appeal,
the plaintiff raised an equal protection challenge to the application
of the PLRA’s fee restrictions to his case.68 In summarily rejecting
the plaintiff’s arguments, the court of appeals held that “Congress
has a legitimate interest in curbing meritless prisoner litigation”
and that “making indigent prisoners partially responsible for the
costs of their litigation would decrease the amount of such meritless litigation.”69 To support this argument, the court relied on earlier cases that had addressed the validity of the PLRA’s fee
restrictions in the context of conditions of confinement litigation.70 The court did not address the possibility that the legitimate
government interests generally justifying the PLRA might not apply
in the instant case.
63 Hampton, 106 F.3d at 1286; see also Nicholas v. Tucker, 114 F.3d 17, 20 (2d Cir.
1997); Shabazz v. Parsons, 127 F.3d 1246, 1248 (10th Cir. 1997) (“[courts have] uniformly concluded that the provisions pass constitutional muster.”).
64 See Sirbaugh, 25 F. App’x at 266.
65 See Robbins II, 435 F.3d at 1238.
66 Lefkowitz v. Citi-Equity Group, Inc., 146 F.3d 609, 610 (8th Cir. 1998).
67 See id. at 610–11.
68 See id.
69 Id. at 612.
70 Id. (citing Nicholas v. Tucker, 114 F.3d 17, 20–21 (2d Cir. 1997); Roller v. Gunn,
107 F.3d 227, 233–34 (4th Cir. 1997)).
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The court in Sirbaugh v. Young employed similarly superficial
analysis in rejecting an equal protection challenge to a Michigan
statute modeled after the PLRA.71 The plaintiff in Sirbaugh was a
prisoner who had attempted to appeal an unfavorable ruling of a
divorce court IFP. In processing his appeal, a state court applied
Michigan’s prohibition on IFP filings by prisoners and declined to
waive the filing fee.72 The plaintiff challenged the application of
the state act to his appeal, asserting that he was denied equal protection of the law.73 The case made its way to the Sixth Circuit
Court of Appeals, where a panel of judges held that the plaintiff’s
rights had not been violated.74
Like the Lefkowitz court, the Sixth Circuit gave no reason why
the rationales generally justifying the PLRA’s IFP prohibition could
be used to justify the imposition of filing fees on collateral prisoner
litigation. Instead, the court ruled that because it had previously
rejected a constitutional challenge to the PLRA’s fee restrictions,
and because Michigan’s statute was modeled after the PLRA, the
plaintiff’s equal protection argument had no merit.75 However, the
precedent it cited in support of this blanket proposition dealt with
the imposition of filing fees on a prisoner bringing a First Amendment claim against a correctional institution.76 Without conducting
any meaningful analysis, the court of appeals decided that the denial of IFP status to a prisoner appealing an adverse divorce ruling
satisfied rational basis review.77
Lefkowitz and Sirbaugh appear to be the only published opinions in which courts have considered the constitutionality of the
PLRA’s fees provisions as applied to collateral prisoner litigation.
Perhaps this dearth of jurisprudence is due to the fact that the
courts have long since agreed on the fee provisions’ facial constitutionality78 and thus overlook the fact that collateral prisoner litigation presents a different set of issues. The application of fee
restrictions to collateral prisoner litigation, which is much less
likely to be baseless than conditions of confinement litigation, can71

Sirbaugh v. Young, 25 F. App’x 266 (6th Cir. 2001).
See id. at 268.
73 See id.
74 Id. at 268–69.
75 See id. at 268.
76 Id. (citing Hampton v. Hobbs, 106 F.3d 1281, 1284–88 (6th Cir. 1997)).
77 See id. (“The defendants’ actions did not violate Sirbaugh’s constitutional right
of access to the courts because his state court case did not involve a fundamental
human interest such as the termination of parental rights or the ability to obtain a
divorce.”).
78 See, e.g., cases cited supra note 63.
72
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not be justified by the government’s interest in deterring frivolous
litigation. The courts, however, have thus far failed to articulate
another rational basis for the imposition of fee restrictions on
these prisoner litigants.
ii.

Cases Approving the Application of Fee Restrictions to
Collateral Prisoner Litigation Based on Statutory
Interpretation

Courts have also rejected statute-based challenges to certain
applications of the PLRA’s fee restrictions, dismissing arguments
that Congress did not intend for the Act to apply to collateral prisoner litigation. These holdings generally rely on the plain language of the fee restriction provisions, which explicitly apply to
“any action brought by a prisoner”79 and “civil action[s] or . . .
appeal[s].”80 The analysis found in these cases is more substantial
than that found in the cases considered in the preceding section,
and their reading of the PLRA is persuasive. But they still neglect
to identify any rational basis for applying the PLRA’s fee restrictions to collateral prisoner litigation.
The most substantial decision in this category came in Robbins
v. Chronister (Robbins II),81 in which the Tenth Circuit, en banc,
held that the PLRA’s attorney’s fees provisions applied to all prisoner litigation.82 Overruling an earlier panel decision, the court
fixated on the legitimacy of the government’s interest in deterring
prisoners from litigating. According to the court, there was “nothing absurd about reducing [the incentive to litigate] for all civilrights claims filed by prisoners, not just those challenging conditions in prison.”83 The court went on to reason that prisoners, because of their abundance of free time and access to free legal
materials, should be discouraged from litigating all claims, not
merely those related to their incarceration.84 Though it acknowledged that “applying the PLRA cap to cases like this is not the most
rational means for controlling litigation,” the court found that this
application was well within the “bounds of legitimate legislative
compromise.”85
79

42 U.S.C. § 1997e(d)(1) (2006).
28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1) (2006).
81 Robbins II, 435 F.3d 1238 (10th Cir. 2006) (en banc).
82 Id. at 1244. But see Reyes, 90 F.3d at 676 (exceptions for habeas actions, and in
some jurisdictions, writs of mandamus).
83 Robbins II, 435 F.3d at 1244.
84 Id.
85 Id.
80

66

CUNY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 15:53

In defending the rationality of applying fee restrictions to collateral litigation, the Robbins II court focused on the differences
between prisoner litigants and the general public. According to the
court,
The balance of incentives and disincentives for filing suit is quite
different for prisoners than for free persons, regardless of the
subject matter of the claim, whether it be prison conditions or
preincarceration conduct. Free persons must weigh the value of
a possible victory in court against the burdens on their time and
wallets in pursuing litigation. Prisoners, in contrast, have time in
abundance, do not need money for their own necessities, and
are entitled to free legal assistance or access to legal materials.
And what may be perceived as burdens to free persons, such as
taking time for depositions or court appearances, may well be
considered an attractive change of scenery for prisoners.86

While Robbins II affirmed the viability of attorney’s fees restrictions, a different court of appeals has approved the application of
the PLRA’s IFP prohibition to collateral prisoner litigation. In
United States v. Jones, the Fourth Circuit rejected the plaintiff’s contention that “Congress intended for the PLRA to encompass only
prisoner civil rights cases.”87 The court, while recognizing that the
IFP prohibition was primarily intended to discourage frivolous civil
rights litigation, stressed that the plain language of the statute covered all “civil actions.”88 Denying the plaintiff’s petition to proceed
in forma pauperis in his motion to recover property seized by the
state, the court determined that Congress must have meant for the
fee restrictions to apply to all civil actions.89 In so ruling, the court
did not identify any reasons why this application was presumptively
rational or constitutional.
iii.

Willful Blindness

The four cases discussed in the preceding subsections are the
only instances in which federal courts have explicitly rejected challenges to the application of fee restrictions to collateral prisoner
litigation. Many other courts, however, simply impose fee restrictions on all prisoner litigation, without any consideration of
whether this practice is constitutionally or statutorily sound. Prison86
87
88
89

Id.
United States v. Jones, 215 F.3d 467, 469 (4th Cir. 2000).
Id.
Id.
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ers challenging child support determinations,90 appealing adverse
bankruptcy court rulings,91 and litigating police brutality claims,92
have all been subjected to fee restrictions imposed or inspired by
the PLRA. Moreover, these examples consist only of published federal court opinions. In practice, it appears that the courts comprehensively require prisoners to pay filing fees, regardless of the
subject matter of the litigation.93 In states such as Colorado and
Wisconsin,94 then, it may be that prisoners are deterred from litigating or appealing all important grievances. Even if one accepts
the Robbins II court’s argument that all civil rights litigation on the
part of prisoners must be discouraged, it is difficult to justify the
imposition of filing fees on inmates challenging divorce court
rulings.
B.

Contrary to Legislative Intent?

Only three courts have disagreed with the majority view regarding the application of the PLRA’s fee restrictions to collateral
inmate litigation. A court of appeals panel decision applied the absurdity exception of statutory interpretation to argue that Congress
could not have meant to limit the award of attorney’s fees to inmate plaintiffs who had brought successful collateral civil rights litigation.95 However, that opinion was subsequently overruled by
Robbins II,96 discussed in Section III.A.ii, supra. Two later cases both
came out of the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. These decisions
cited the original Robbins decision but ultimately relied upon the
“whole act” rule of statutory interpretation to determine that Congress had intended to limit the PLRA’s application to conditions of
confinement litigation.97 These three cases stand in direct contrast
90 See, e.g., Grant v. State of New Jersey, No. Civ. 04-1748 (DMC), 2005 WL
1528920, at *1 (D.N.J. June 28, 2005).
91 See, e.g., In re Blumeyer, No. 4:06CV1681 CDP, 2007 WL 209917, at *1 (E.D. Mo.
Jan. 24, 2007).
92 See, e.g., Hopper v. Rinaldi, 2:07-CV-05323, 2008 WL 558049, at *1 (D.N.J. Feb.
29, 2008).
93 Justice Emily Goodman of New York Supreme Court indicates that the New
York court system does not allow any prisoner to proceed in forma pauperis, regardless of the substance of the litigation. Interview with Emily Goodman, Justice of the
Supreme Court of New York, in New York, N.Y. (Feb. 2, 2011).
94 See COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-17.5-103(2) (West 2010); State ex rel. Cramer v.
Schwarz, 613 N.W.2d 591, 601 (Wis. 2000).
95 Robbins I, 402 F.3d 1047, 1051–55 (10th Cir. 2005).
96 Robbins II, 435 F.3d 1238 (10th Cir. 2006) (en banc).
97 See Hall v. Galie, No. 05-975, 2009 WL 722278, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 17, 2009);
Hatchett v. Cnty. of Phila., No. 09-1708, 2010 WL 4054285, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 15,
2010).
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to the majority interpretation of the PLRA and make valiant efforts
to prove that collateral prisoner litigants should not be subjected
to fee restrictions. There is, however, a reason that they represent
the minority rule. The plain language of the PLRA frustrates the
courts’ creative attempts to achieve an equitable result.
In Robbins I, the court took the “extraordinary” step of holding
that it would be “absurd” to apply the PLRA’s attorney’s fees restrictions to collateral prisoner litigation.98 Confronted with the
plain language of the PLRA’s attorney’s fee provisions, which apply
to “any action brought by a prisoner,” the court noted that it had a
duty to interpret the Act in a way that would effectuate congressional intent.99 After discussing the legislative history of the PLRA,
the court concluded that there was no evidence that Congress had
intended to “impose a fee limitation on pre-incarceration civil rights
claims brought by plaintiffs who subsequently become prisoners.”100
Then, citing recent Supreme Court cases using the absurdity
exception to depart from a statute’s plain meaning, the court ruled
that the PLRA could not be interpreted to apply to collateral prisoner litigation.101 Finding a dearth of any indication that Congress
had intended to curtail pre-incarceration civil rights claims, the
court held that “failing to distinguish between pre-incarceration
cases and post-incarceration cases would lead to absurd results.”102
However, the Robbins I order was overruled by Robbins II and is no
longer good law.
The Eastern District of Pennsylvania is the only other court to
find the PLRA’s fee restrictions inapplicable to collateral prisoner
litigation. In two published opinions, the district court relied on
the “whole act rule” to arrive at a counterintuitive interpretation of
the PLRA’s plain language. As the court explained in Hall v. Gallie,
“[t]he whole act rule directs that ‘when interpreting a statute, the
court will not look merely to a particular clause in which general
words may be used, but will take in connection with it the whole
statute . . . and the objects and policy of the law . . . .’”103 Applying
this interpretative method to the PLRA’s attorney’s fees provision,
the district court determined that the “prison conditions” language
found in the first section of the Act should be imputed to the rest
98

Robbins I, 402 F.3d at 1050.
Id.
100 Id. at 1051.
101 Id. at 1051–52.
102 Id. at 1054.
103 Hall v. Gallie, No. 05-975, 2009 WL 722278, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 17, 2009) (quoting Hernandez v. Kalinowski, 146 F.3d 196, 200 (3d Cir. 1998)).
99
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of the statute.104 Accordingly, the court found that the statute’s
limits on attorney’s fees only applied to litigation concerning conditions of confinement.105 This reasoning was echoed in a subsequent case in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania,106 and it appears
that the settled law of the district is to allow prisoners litigating
matters collateral to their incarceration to recover full attorney’s
fees.
The Eastern District of Pennsylvania, however, is alone among
the federal courts in its interpretation of the PLRA’s attorney’s fee
restrictions. And while the court’s application of the “whole act”
rule is not unreasonable, the majority rule is much more consistent
with the language and spirit of the PLRA. The animating purpose
of the PLRA was to frustrate the ability of prisoners to access the
courts, which at the time, were overburdened by prison litigation.
The Act’s apparent application of fee restrictions to all inmate litigation—not merely conditions litigation—is consistent with this
goal. The “prison conditions” language of the first section of the
Act107 must be logically read as limited to that section; it would be
nonsensical to impose an exhaustion requirement on litigation unrelated to conditions of confinement, because no administrative
grievance process would be available. Additionally, the fact that different sections of the Act explicitly apply to different types of lawsuits (“conditions,” “all actions brought by prisoners,” and “civil
actions or appeals”) indicates that Congress consciously drafted
certain portions of the statute to apply to collateral prisoner litigation. Despite the best efforts of the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, it is difficult to construe the PLRA’s fee restrictions as
applying exclusively to prison conditions litigation.
There is some evidence that Congress paid inadequate attention to detail in drafting the PLRA, a fact which could support the
argument that the Act was sloppily worded and only meant to apply
to prison conditions litigation. As critics have noted, the PLRA was
hastily passed, failed to define key terms, and was inconsistent with
preexisting law in some sections.108 Perhaps, in a rush to respond
104

Id. at *7.
Id.
106 Hatchett v. Cnty. of Phila., No. 09-1708, 2010 WL 4054285, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Oct.
15, 2010).
107 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (2010) (“No action shall be brought with respect to prison
conditions under section 1983 of this title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner
confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative
remedies as are available are exhausted.”).
108 Susan N. Herman, Slashing and Burning Prisoners’ Rights: Congress and the Supreme
Court in Dialogue, 77 OR. L. REV. 1229, 1277 (1998).
105
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to a perceived crisis of unbounded prisoner litigation, Congress
failed to accurately articulate the applicability of the PLRA’s fee
restrictions. But it is impossible to know whether this interpretation
has any basis in fact: the PLRA’s drafters left almost no legislative
history behind, and the Act can therefore only be judged on the
basis of its plain language. Through this language, in an internally
consistent legislative structure, the PLRA’s drafters indicated that
the Act’s fee provisions would apply to collateral prisoner litigation. Therefore, while the rationality of this operation of the Act is
questionable, arguments that the PLRA’s fee restrictions do not apply to collateral litigation are unpersuasive.
C.

The Uncertain Status of Collateral Prisoner Litigation

Congress clearly intended for the PLRA’s fee restrictions to
apply to collateral inmate litigation. Yet courts have been unable to
articulate a rational basis for this application. Part of the problem
may be that few courts have addressed the constitutionality of this
trend. But even the courts that have considered the issue have
failed to demonstrate why the imposition of fee restrictions on collateral prisoner litigation is not an irrational policy in violation of
the Equal Protection Clause. The remainder of the article will attempt to fill this analytical gap.
IV.

THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF FEE RESTRICTIONS
COLLATERAL PRISON LITIGATION

ON

When a law draws distinctions between groups of United
States citizens, imposing burdens or benefits on one group that are
not experienced by another, it is subject to review under the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.109 Laws that differentiate between groups on the basis of a classification recognized as suspect by the Supreme Court are subjected to a
heightened standard of review.110 In contrast, laws that place burdens upon individuals who are not members of a suspect class are
evaluated under rational basis review. The traditional formulation
of this test requires that laws be “rationally related” to a “legitimate
government interest.”111 Rational basis review is largely deferential
to the legislative goals enunciated by legislatures, but the test has
been employed to invalidate irrational laws unconnected to any
109

U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 1.
See, e.g., United States v. Carolene Prod. Co., 304 U.S. 144, n.4 (1938) (establishing the concepts of strict scrutiny, rational basis).
111 See, e.g., San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 40 (1973).
110
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reasonable government purpose.112
Prisoners are not considered a suspect class by the federal
courts. Although the Supreme Court has not addressed the issue,
the lower courts “have uniformly held that prisoners are a nonsuspect group because status as a prisoner is not an immutable
characteristic; entry into the class is voluntary; and entry into the
class requires commission of an illegal act.”113 As-applied constitutional challenges to the PLRA’s fee restrictions, therefore, are governed by the rational basis test. Even under this lax standard,
however, the application of fee restrictions to certain collateral
prisoner litigation is unconstitutional. These applications of fee restrictions are in no way rationally related to the legitimate government interest in deterring frivolous litigation, and it is impossible
to conceive of any other legitimate government interest to which
they are rationally related. As a result, the PLRA’s fee restrictions,
as applied to certain collateral prisoner litigation, violate the Fourteenth Amendment. The courts have a duty to conduct a small, but
significant, reversal of the general trend of abrogating prisoners’
constitutional rights by striking down this application of the PLRA.
A.

A Brief Discussion of the Rational Basis Test’s Viability

It has been said that the Supreme Court’s infrequent use of
the rational basis test to strike down statutes and regulations constitutes an “active”114 or “rational basis with bite”115 test more akin to
intermediate scrutiny. But despite the efforts of commentators and
dissenters to interpret these cases as having been decided under a
heightened standard, the Court has been clear that its use of the
rational basis test to find laws unconstitutional does not constitute
intermediate scrutiny.116 This refrain is consistent with the scattershot character of rational basis equal protection claims that have
112 See, e.g., Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982) (striking down statute denying funding for education of children of aliens via rational basis review).
113 Jason Pepe, Challenging Congress’s Latest Attempt to Confine Prisoners’ Constitutional
Rights, 23 HAMLINE L. REV. 58, 72. See also Nicholas v. Tucker, 114 F.3d 17, 20 (2d Cir.
1997) (“inmates are not a suspect class”); Hampton v. Hobbs, 106 F.3d 1281, 1286
(6th Cir. 1997) (“neither prisoners nor indigents are a suspect class”).
114 See, e.g., Alfonso Madrid, Comment: Rational Basis Review Goes Back to the Dentist’s
Chair, 4 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 167 (1994) (discussing what the author and
some lower courts term the “active rational basis test”).
115 See, e.g., Gayle Lynn Pettinga, Rational Basis with Bite: Intermediate Scrutiny by Any
Other Name, 62 IND. L.J. 779 (1987) (arguing that applications of rational basis test
causing laws to be invalidated are functionally intermediate scrutiny).
116 See, e.g., Kadrmas v. Dickinson Pub. Sch., 487 U.S. 450, 457–58 (1988) (citing
Plyler, 457 U.S. 202, for the proposition that laws must be rationally related to legitimate government interests).
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been successful in the Supreme Court. As one study has found, the
ten successful equal protection claims under the rational basis standard in the Supreme Court from 1973 to 1996 cannot be explained
by reference to the “nature of the class disadvantaged” or “the government interest involved.”117 Indeed, it is difficult to argue that
the Court has singled out “newcomers, out-of-staters, hippies, undocumented aliens, the mentally retarded, nonfreeholders, and
gays”118 as quasi-suspect classes warranting intermediate scrutiny.
Although the Supreme Court’s occasional use of the rational
basis review to invalidate laws has bedeviled academics and lower
courts seeking a pattern in its jurisprudence, these cases are not
inconsistent with the letter of the test itself. While most laws are
enacted to specifically address legitimate government interests, it is
clear that illegitimate government interests exist and likewise evident that some laws are in no way related to genuine legislative
goals. Understandably, most statutes and regulations considered by
the Supreme Court are not sufficiently flawed to violate the rational basis standard. However, when confronted with a law that,
for example, seeks to promote “the creation and perpetuation of a
subclass of illiterates,”119 the Court has demonstrated that rational
basis does not operate as a rubber stamp for the irrational whims of
legislatures.
B.

The Government Interest in Deterring Frivolous Prisoner Litigation:
Inapplicable to Certain Collateral Litigation

The PLRA has been challenged ad nauseum by prisoners and
advocates to little effect. Throughout a vast body of jurisprudence
upholding the Act’s constitutionality, the courts have echoed a
consistent refrain: the government has a legitimate interest in
preventing frivolous and excessive prisoner litigation, the existence
of which has been thoroughly documented.120 But though the va117 Robert C. Farrell, Successful Rational Basis Claims in the Supreme Court from the 1971
Term Through Romer v. Evans, 32 IND. L. REV. 357, 411–13 (1999).
118 Id. (citing Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996); Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Co.
v. Cnty. Comm’n, 488 U.S. 336 (1989); Quinn v. Millsap, 491 U.S. 95 (1989); Hooper
v. Bernalillo Cnty. Assessor, 472 U.S. 612 (1985); City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living
Ctr., 473 U.S. 432 (1985); Williams v. Vermont, 472 U.S. 14 (1985); Metropolitan Life
Ins. Co. v. Ward, 470 U.S. 869 (1985); Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55 (1982); Plyler v.
Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982); U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973)).
119 Plyler, 457 U.S. at 230.
120 See, e.g., Murray v. Dosal, 150 F.3d 814, 818 (8th Cir. 1998); Tucker v. Branker,
142 F.3d 1294, 1300 (D.C. Cir. 1998); Nicholas v. Tucker, 114 F.3d 17, 20 (2d Cir.
1997); Hampton v. Hobbs, 106 F.3d 1281, 1286 (6th Cir. 1997); Roller v. Gunn, 107
F.3d 227, 233 (4th Cir. 1997).
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lidity of this government interest is firmly established, there is no
relationship between the denial of IFP status to a prisoner seeking
to appeal a child support or bankruptcy ruling and the prevention
of frivolous litigation. Collateral inmate litigation is not at all characteristic of the type of litigation that prompted Congress to pass
the PLRA,121 nor is it especially vulnerable to frivolity.122 Instead,
such litigation is representative of significant legal problems experienced by all Americans. A rational relationship simply does not
exist between deterring prisoners from pursuing significant legal
matters unrelated to their incarceration and preventing gratuitous
and systematically burdensome civil rights litigation.
Although the Act’s legislative history is limited,123 the available
evidence indicates that Congress had a clear and defined goal it
sought to achieve by enacting the PLRA. Since there were no committee markups accompanying the bill and little debate within the
legislature, the congressional intent behind the PLRA can only be
determined by reference to the Act itself and to statements made
on the floor of Congress in support of the Act.124 In these endorsements, which have formed the foundation of the rational basis articulated by the courts in response to constitutional challenges to
the PLRA, the Act’s sponsors unambiguously stated that the Act
was primarily intended to address frivolous prison litigation.
Senator Orrin Hatch, the chief sponsor of the PLRA, justified
the Act on the floor of Congress by arguing that it would “help
bring relief to a civil justice system overburdened by frivolous prisoner lawsuits,” “help restore balance to prison conditions litigation,” and “ensure that Federal court orders are limited to
remedying actual violations of prisoners’ rights . . . .”125 To demonstrate the types of litigation the PLRA was meant to deter, Senator
Jon Kyl read a “Top Ten” list of frivolous prisoner suits into the
Congressional Record, including cases in which prisoners challenged
video-game confiscations and the provision of chunky, rather than
121

See 141 CONG. REC., S14,629 (daily ed. Sept. 29, 1995).
See, e.g., Grant v. State of New Jersey, No. Civ. 04-1748, 2005 WL 1528920, at *3
(D.N.J. June 28, 2005) (applying IFP prohibition to inmate appealing adverse child
support determination).
123 See Herman, supra note 108, at 1277 (discussing the lack of consideration or
debate preceding the passage of the PLRA).
124 See Ann H. Matthews, The Inapplicability of the Prison Litigation Reform Act to Prisoner Claims of Excessive Force, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 536, 560–61 (2002) (noting that the
legislative intent behind the PLRA can only be determined by reference to statements
made on the floor of Congress). See also Riewe, supra note 4, at 142 (discussing the
dearth of legislative history in support of the PLRA).
125 141 CONG. REC. S14,418 (1995).
122
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smooth, peanut butter.126 These examples were used to build support for the proposition that the PLRA would “help put an end to
the inmate litigation fun-and-games.”127
It is necessary here to note that the PLRA’s consequences have
extended far beyond the discouragement of “fun-and-games” enjoyed at the expense of the federal courts. While foundationless
prisoner litigation was a tangible and significant problem during
the early 1990s,128 the PLRA’s provisions have operated to deny
remedies to prisoners who have experienced serious violations of
their legal and constitutional rights. The Act’s exhaustive requirements, in particular, have been responsible for a massive decrease
in prisoner litigation, and the extent to which “the suits which the
PLRA has evidently deterred were frivolous” is unclear.129 Thus, although the PLRA has apparently succeeded in limiting foundationless prisoner litigation, it has also arbitrarily prevented “real abuses
that take place within the prison system” from being litigated.130
The ongoing Plata and Coleman litigation131 challenging horrific
conditions of confinement in California prisons demonstrates the
manifest necessity of effective legal avenues through which prisoners may vindicate their constitutional rights.
Notwithstanding these concerns, the courts have unvaryingly
decided that the government interest in deterring frivolous inmate
litigation is a legitimate one. These findings of legitimacy, however,
have been predicated on the existence of a nexus between imposing fee limitations and forcing prisoners to carefully consider
whether to litigate marginal issues such as those detailed by Senators Hatch and Kyl. Denying IFP status to prisoners filing for bank126

141 CONG. REC. S14,629 (daily ed. Sept. 29, 1995).
141 CONG. REC. S14,626 (daily ed. Sept. 29, 1995) (statement of Sen. Bob Dole).
128 See Schlanger, supra note 2, at 1592–1627. Professor Schlanger affirms, with
qualifications, the baseline presumption underlying the PLRA: that prisoner civil
rights litigation in the federal courts was extremely common and had a low rate of
success. According to Professor Schlanger’s data, about 80% of inmate civil rights
suits were dismissed prior to trial during the period from 1990–1995. Notwithstanding
the many factors that contribute to prisoners’ difficulty in successfully suing correctional institutions, including inadequate access to counsel and an oppositional culture within the correctional system, there is support for the proposition that baseless
inmate litigation had become a problem in the early-to-mid 1990s. Id.
129 Kermit Roosevelt III, Exhaustion Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act: The Consequence of Procedural Error, 52 EMORY L.J. 1771, 1779 (2003).
130 Id. at 1776.
131 See Coleman v. Schwarzenegger, No. CIV S-90-0520 LKK JFM P, 2009 WL
2430820 (E.D. and N.D. Cal. Aug. 4, 2009) (ordering release of California prisoners as
remedy for gross constitutional violations), aff’d, Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910
(2011).
127
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ruptcy132 or appealing the rulings of divorce courts cannot be seen
as a rational means of curtailing frivolous inmate litigation. In contrast to the typical foundationless prisoner lawsuit, in which a prisoner may file and burden the court system without proving that
any of his legal rights have been implicated,133 a prisoner filing for
bankruptcy will typically have compelling, and legally recognized,
reasons to do so. Imposing fee restrictions on collateral prisoner
litigation unrelated to civil rights issues is not a rational means of
achieving the legitimate governmental goal of preventing frivolous
litigation.
Courts applying the PLRA’s fee restrictions to collateral litigation have drawn an arbitrary distinction between prisoners and
other indigents without articulating any rationale for this discrimination. Senator Hatch’s claim that prison conditions litigation was
out of control was somewhat supported by the burden felt by federal courts and high rates of frivolous filings. There has been no
such showing that collateral inmate litigation is burdensome, foundationless, or even more commonly brought by prisoners than by
the general population. The presumption that prisoners consider
the courts to be “an attractive change of scenery”134 does not have
any relevance to collateral litigation absent some indication that
prisoners abuse bankruptcy or divorce proceedings as a means of
temporarily escaping their cells. It is clear that the prisoner suits
actually burdening the courts at the time of the PLRA’s enactment
were related to prison conditions.135 A rational response to those
frivolous filings does not include the imposition of fee restrictions
on collateral prisoner litigation, which can only be brought under
certain circumstances and which is not vulnerable to abuse.
Separately, the Due Process Clause unquestionably prohibits
the imposition of fee restrictions on prisoners filing for divorce or
contesting child custody determinations. Indigent litigants in divorce proceedings have a constitutionally protected right to proceed IFP.136 This right is derived from the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment and relates to court access rather than
the nondiscrimination principle,137 but it is applicable to all indigents, including prisoners. Due process also requires that indigents
132

See, e.g., Lefkowitz v. Citi-Equity Group, 146 F.3d 609 (8th Cir. 1998).
See Schlanger, supra note 2.
134 Robbins II, 435 F.3d 1238, 1244 (10th Cir. 2006) (en banc).
135 See Robbins I, 402 F.3d 1047, 1050–54 (10th Cir. 2005).
136 See Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971) (holding that indigents must be
allowed to bring divorce proceedings).
137 Id. at 382–83.
133
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be granted IFP status in cases and appeals affecting child custody
rights.138 It should be noted that the right to family-related court
access does not extend to purely pecuniary divorce appeals relating
to the distribution of marital property.139 However, as detailed
above, the application of fee restrictions to such collateral litigation is independently unconstitutional under the Equal Protection
Clause.
The United States Congress and members of the Supreme
Court have similarly acknowledged the importance of providing
fee waivers to indigents in bankruptcy court. As discussed, the denial of IFP status to prisoners in bankruptcy filings and appeals is
not rationally related to any legitimate government interest, a conclusion given further substance by the significance of fee waivers in
these proceedings. The enactment of the Bankruptcy Abuse and
Consumer Protection Act of 2005 (BAPCPA),140 which provided indigent persons with the right to proceed IFP in bankruptcy proceedings, was meant to solve a longstanding paradox of bankruptcy
filings: that “some of the poor are too poor even to go bankrupt.”141 Strangely, BAPCPA does not apply to inmate filings,142 although the Act reflects a congressional intent to demonstrate that
“the court system is open to rich and poor alike,”143 and although
four Supreme Court Justices have ruled that a constitutional right
to IFP bankruptcy proceedings exists for indigents.144 Unlike divorce and child custody proceedings, there is no constitutional
right to file IFP in bankruptcy proceedings, but the recognized importance of filing fee waivers in this context is further demonstration of the irrationality of federal law’s discrimination against
prisoners in these matters.
In contrast, the application of fee restrictions to prisoner civil
rights litigation unrelated to conditions of confinement is constitutional. Like conditions litigation, all prisoners have common experience from which to base civil rights claims related to police
138
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Sirbaugh v. Young, 25 F. App’x 266, 268 (6th Cir. 2001) (“The defendants’ actions did not violate Sirbaugh’s constitutional right of access to the courts because his
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brutality, wrongful arrest, or other issues collateral to criminal conduct. Just as many prisoners have grievances with their treatment
while incarcerated,145 many prisoners believe their rights were violated in the course of their interactions with police.146 While legal
issues collateral to incarceration, such as divorce, are not faced by
all inmates, many inmates share common experiences giving rise to
civil rights litigation.147Additionally, unlike divorce court appeals
or motions to have property returned, pre-incarceration civil rights
litigation can be frivolously filed without any underlying basis. Accordingly, the courts have a rational basis for applying fee restrictions to collateral prisoner civil rights litigation.
There is a clear constitutional mandate to provide IFP status to
prisoners in divorce and child custody proceedings. Insofar as they
fail to contain savings clauses to this effect, the PLRA and analogous state statutes are unconstitutional. Additionally, the application of fee restrictions to collateral litigation such as bankruptcy
proceedings, motions to recover seized property, and appeals of
divorce court rulings is not rationally related to the government
interest in deterring frivolous litigation and is therefore unconstitutional. Although actions such as appeals of property court determinations in divorce proceedings are not covered by Supreme
Court precedent establishing a right to court access,148 IFP filing
has traditionally been seen as especially necessary in divorce and
bankruptcy proceedings and it is patently irrational to deny prisoners this privilege enjoyed by all other indigents. In contrast, the
application of fee restrictions to collateral civil rights litigation conforms to the requirements of equal protection. Although this application may have “little, if any, effect in terms of curbing frivolous
litigation,”149 it is at least rationally related to a legitimate government interest. The application of fee restrictions to other collateral
inmate litigation, however, is unconstitutional and must cease.
V.

CONCLUSION: TURNING

THE

TIDE

OF

MASS INCARCERATION

Federal courts have supported and enabled some of the most
significant social change to occur throughout United States his145 See Schlanger, supra note 2, at 1571–72 (noting that “leading topic” of inmate
litigation is challenge to conditions of confinement).
146 Id. (discussing the notable percentage of inmate litigation alleging mistreatment by police and other non-correctional actors).
147 Id. (discussing the consistent subject matter underlying most inmate litigation).
148 See Sirbaugh v. Young, 25 F. App’x 266, 268 (6th Cir. 2001).
149 Murray v. Dosal, 150 F.3d 814, 821 (8th Cir. 1998) (Heaney, J., dissenting).
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tory. From Brown v. Board of Education150 to Lawrence v. Texas,151 the
courts have been, at times, a progressive and countermajoritarian
force, operating as a bulwark against the more pernicious tendencies of citizens and legislatures. Mass incarceration may be a more
convoluted issue than segregation or homophobia, but as a social
phenomenon, it is no less destructive. Sadly, the courts have participated in, rather than prevented, this destructive trend, particularly
in the wake of the PLRA. Legislatures will always have incentives to
promote strict crime control policies and are unlikely to be the
vanguards of change. Courts have a duty to protect us from our
baser instincts, such as the decision to imprison the young, black,
and poor members of society in great numbers and deprive them
of their constitutional rights.
For years, California has been one of the leaders in hyper-punitive criminal justice policy and over-incarceration,152 an experiment that has contributed to the state’s fiscal crisis153 and forced
the federal courts to take drastic measures to correct the draconian
conditions in its prisons.154 As a result of the valuable political capital available in tough crime control policies, the influence of the
powerful correctional industry, and a culture of bureaucratic disentitlement, the California legislature allowed the conditions in its
prisons to deteriorate to levels that might be expected in the prisons of an unstable developing country.155 For decades, the state
staunchly defended against meritorious claims asserted in the Coleman and Plata class actions, a recalcitrance that finally caused a
panel of three federal judges to order the release of a substantial
number of prisoners.156 Even after this order and in the face of an
undeniable pattern of constitutional violations, California’s legislative and executive branches continue to resist any significant re150

347 U.S. 483 (1954).
539 U.S. 558 (2003).
152 See, e.g., Vincent Schiraldi, Criminal Justice Reform: Public Turnabout on Three
Strikes, S.F. GATE, July 6, 2004, available at http://articles.sfgate.com/2004-07-06/opinion/17435648_1_three-strikes-third-strike-violent-crimes (noting that the number of
California prisoners serving time under three-strikes law was equivalent to the aggregate prison population of forty other states).
153 See, e.g., Michael P. Jacobsen, Crisis and Opportunity in California’s Prison System, 13
BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 319 (2008) (discussing the impact that prison growth in California has had on the fiscal crisis faced by the state).
154 See Coleman v. Schwarzenegger, No. CIV S-90-0520 LKK JFM P, 2009 WL
2430820, at *1 (E.D. and N.D. Cal. Aug. 4, 2009), aff’d, Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910
(2011).
155 See Jacobsen, supra note, 153 at 320 (discussing the “toxic political mix” impeding meaningful prison reform and resulting in federal court intervention).
156 See Coleman, 2009 WL 2430820, at *1.
151

2011]

AN IRRATIONAL OVERSIGHT

79

forms. The circumstances surrounding this litigation are
representative of a broad governmental unwillingness to reverse
failed criminal justice policies. If meaningful and necessary change
is to come, it must come from the judiciary.
Striking down the PLRA’s IFP restrictions as applied to collateral prison litigation would be a small, but significant, step in a
process of change led by the courts. While the rationality of the
PLRA is generally unassailable, there is no constitutionally legitimate reason for the application of its fee restrictions to divorce and
bankruptcy proceedings. It appears that a solution to the deeper
problems of mass incarceration and prisoner litigation is not forthcoming. But, at the margins, the courts have the ability to deny
legislatures their more irrational means of dealing with prisoners.
If the courts are capable of establishing the high water mark beyond which prisoners’ constitutional rights may not be diluted any
further, perhaps the broader trend of the country’s evolution into
a carceral regime will begin to reverse itself.

